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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GEORGE ISAAC HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20040833-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Hernandez's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary? This Court 
reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of 
discretion standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's 
findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 
433 (Utah 1996). "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly 
complied with . . . procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law 
that is reviewed for correctness." Id. This issue was preserved in Hernandez's motions to 
withdraw his guilty plea (R. 44-46, 67-68, 78-82). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
George Hernandez appeals from the judgment, sentence, and conviction of the 
Third District Court after denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
George Isaac Hernandez was charged by amended information filed in the Third 
District Court on or about July 11, 2003, with Assault (domestic violence), a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-102(3)(a) (R. 1, 6). 
On August 12, 2003, Hernandez entered a guilty plea to assault, a class B 
misdemeanor (R. 104: 1-3). In taking the plea, the trial court advised Hernandez that 
" [t]he charge alleges that on the 22nd day of November last year you attempted with 
unlawful force or violence to do bodily injury to someone11 (R. 104: 1). The trial court 
also informed Hernandez of the maximum penalties and of his consitutional rights (R. 
2 
104:2). 
Hernandez also signed a written Statement of Defendant Entering a Guilty Plea (R. 
83-84). The written statement is signed by Hernandez and his counsel (R. 84). It 
contains a waiver of constitutional rights and lists the offense, its classification, and 
potential fine and term of imprisonment (Id.). The statement also contains the following 
statement: "I have received and read or had read to me a copy of the Information which 
states the crime(s) with which I am charged. I understand the charges against me. I have 
no questions about what I am accused of having done" (R. 83). 
On September 8, 2003? Hernandez, pro se, filed a motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea (R. 44-46). 
On October 7,2003, Hernandez failed to appear at a sentencing hearing and a 
warrant was issued for his arrest (R. 49-50). Hernandez was subsequently released from 
custody but he failed to appear at a bench warrant hearing and the arrest warrant was 
reissued on November 13, 2003 (R. 57-59). 
On June 8, 2004, counsel for Hernandez was given leave to file an amended 
motion to withdraw guilty plea (R. 104: 8-9). Counsel filed the amended motion on June 
18, 2004 (R. 67-68). A hearing was held on July 12, 2004, at which time Judge Reese 
took the motion under advisement (R. 104: 12-34). 
On July 22, 2004, Hernandez, pro se, filed an additional motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea (R. 78-82). 
3 
At a hearing on the motions to withdraw plea on August 10, 2004, Judge Reese 
granted Hernandez's request to proceed pro se and allowed counsel, Catherine Lilly, to 
withdraw from the matter (R. 88-89, 104: 40-43). After argument, Judge Reese denied 
the motions to withdraw the plea (R. 104: 52). 
Hernandez was sentenced on August 10, 2004, to 180 days in jail with credit for 
30 days previously served to run concurrent with his other cases (R. 88-89, 104: 60). 
On September 3, 2004, Hernandez mailed a notice of appeal to the Third District 
Court pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (R. 92). The notice 
of appeal was filed by the trial court on September 21, 2004 (Id.). 
Current counsel was subsequently appointed as conflict counsel to represent 
Hernandez on appeal.1 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Hernandez plead guilty to assault, a class B misdemeanor. Prior to sentencing he 
filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in which he argued the following: That he was 
denied his constitutional right to competent counsel when he entered his plea. Counsel 
Fernandez was recently released from the Utah State Hospital pursuant to a 
"guilty but mentally ill" plea entered in Fourth District Court. However, he has not 
contacted counsel with his current whereabouts and counsel have been unable to locate 
him. Without his assistance counsel cannot complete a Rule 23B motion to remand; or 
even file an Anders brief as a copy of counsel's brief must be furnished to Hernandez and 
time allowed for him to raise any points that he chooses. See State v. Wells, 13 P.3d 
1056, U 4. 
4 
never allowed him access to discovery nor did he ask Hernandez "questions or anything. 
He kept on telling me I should take the plea bargain and I fell like I was somewhat 
brainwashed" (R. 44). 
Counsel for Hernandez was subsequently granted leave to file an amended motion 
which alleged that Hernandez is "normally on medications for various mental health 
disorders. Mr. Hernandez was not on his medications at the time he entered his plea and 
was therefore unable to think clearly enough to understand its implications or enter into it 
voluntarily" (R. 67). The motion also alleged that "Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires the court to find that a guilty plea is voluntarily made before the court 
accepts it. A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed. McCarthy v. United 
States. 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 
1983). 
On July 12, 2004, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motions to withdraw 
Hernandez's plea (R. 104: 13-34). Hernandez testified that he entered a plea to a class B 
misdemeanor assault charge in August of 2003 (R. 104: 13). Hernandez was not able to 
review the police reports or other evidence before he entered his plea because his attorney 
told him that "it's not necessary, and that a class B would be okay" (R. 104: 14). 
Hernandez asked his attorney for copies of the discovery several times but was not 
provided with it (R. 104: 14). Hernandez testified that he has since reviewed the reports 
and that he would not have plead guilty if he would have seen them prior to his entry of 
5 
plea (Id.). Hernandez testified that he did not raise this issue with the trial court at the 
time he entered the plea because he was not on his medications and because "I didn't 
know I was supposed to" (R. 104: 25). 
Hernandez testified that he had previously been diagnosed with "psychosis" and as 
"borderline bipolar" when he was in prison in 1999 and in the state hospital in 1997 and 
that he was suffering from the same issues at the time he entered the guilty plea (R. 104: 
15, 16). Hernandez testified that he informed his attorney of the diagnoses but "he just 
said, that's not necessary, he just blew me off (R. 104: 17). Hernandez also indicated 
that he told his attorney about previous mental health e\aluations from Iron County which 
found him mentally ill (R. 104: 18). 
Hernandez also testified that he had been prescribed antipsychotic and 
antipsychosis medications (Seroquel and Amitriptyline) at the time he entered the guilty 
plea (R. 104: 14-15). He was not on his medications when he entered the plea because 
"the jail wouldn't have mental health see me" (R. 104: 15). Hernandez testified that 
"When I'm not on my meds, I really don't know what's going on, I don't understand stuff. 
But when I'm on my meds I think much more clearly" (R. 104: 15-16). He testified that 
he was not able to understand what was happening on the day he entered his plea (R. 104: 
16). Hernandez testified that he was now on his medications and has a better 
understanding of the proceedings and can think more clearly (R. 104: 16). 
Hernandez acknowledged signing the written Statement of Defendant Entering a 
6 
Guilty Plea (R. 104: 19-20). Hernandez also testified that he told the PSI interviewer that 
"I'd been hospitalized in mental health institutions since I was very little, since I was— 
groups since I was about eight years old, and I was currently supposed to be taking 
• T k M l i t i i i • » • . : t - ; , . ! , n
 a 
request, and then put 1 was supposed to be seeing a psych doctor" (R. 104: 23). 
Hernandez testified that he thought the trial court asked him if he was on any medications 
t:l mt \ v oiild hinder 1 lis judgment at the entry of plea, hearing (.,. i,. -.. - ,. i lcrnandez 
never *old thi" ?"''" **** • - \\ ;x eonfusi^d or ih *• ' !~ -!J hi * * . - M\ 
104:29). However, Hernandez testified that he did tell his attorney (R. 104:29). At the 
close of the hearing, counsel for Hernandez asked the trial court to take judicial notice of 
'eoup-* • l \ y . . • . v ; :vi hearing 
specifically asking him about medications or mental health issues1' (R. 104: 31). 
After the hearing, Hernandez, pro se, filed another motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea (R 1 8-81). I lernandez alicgcc L::„: n he nua ocen anic to re\ie\\ me evidence that 
the State had, and had he had thr opportunity lo twu-w tK . !:,v tvporw 
discovery, he would not have plead guilty" (R, 79). Hernandez also alleged that good 
cause supported the withdrawal oi lu* plea as he was denied the assistance of competent 
that was available to the State at the time the defendant entered his plea is still available 
to the State now" (R 80). 
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On August 10, 2004, a second hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea was 
held (R. 104: 35-63). At the commencement of the hearing, Hernandez asked for 
Catherine Lilly to be "fired" because he did not "feel that she's being confident enough to 
handle my case" and because she had not sent him the discovery he had requested on 
numerous occasions (R. 104: 36-37). Lilly offered to have conflict counsel assigned as 
"it was a prior LDA attorney that was handling the initial plea, and maybe another 
attorney outside of the office would be able to argue more vigorously on his behalf (R. 
104: 39). The trial court agreed, however, Hernandez chose to represent himself after the 
trial court advised him of the "problems that are inherent in self-representation" (R. 104: 
40-43). The trial court then gave Hernandez time in the holding area to look through his 
papers and to prepare to argue the matter (R. 104: 44). 
At the close of the hearing the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. 
In regards to the discovery issue, the trial court concluded that this was an issue that 
Hernandez "should have raised at the time and [he] didn't have to plead guilty. If [he'd] 
wanted to see the police reports all [he] would have to have said to me was 'Judge, I'm not 
prepared to plead guilty today. I'd like to see the police reports" and we wouldn't have 
gone any further" (R. 104: 48). 
In regards to the mental health/medication issue and its relationship to the 
knowingness and voluntariness of the guilty plea, the trial court stated that he "reviewed 
the videotape myself to see if it looked like you were confused, if it looked like you were 
8 
104: 49). At the time, Hernandez indicated that he had no questions about the entry of 
plea (R. 104: 49). Additionally, the trial court found that "at one point in the hearing" 
i ici Uiuukv HULK .: '• . .tUL •: ^ w ...-. g r a i n s » ; .. f : wi:... -«u'\ ICL.- : Jicasc :mu Uui, .. 
appeared t n v ' 1 " * ' •* ,:'-;|l,r-; ••» ' •'* •»•. ruct ion * r ' Wclx* . . . 
those questions were clear. There was nothing in your responses to indicate to me that 
you weren't tracking, that you weren't understanding. It appeared to me that all of your 
that "[tjhere's been no doctor or anyone else testify as to the medical effect if you failed to 
take those medications. I've heard nothing like that, only that your own statements that 
;; ' c ii lie eded the medicines and weren't taking tnen. *;. • 
Based on these findinp^ 4K * - <! ni. J il m .h-/\ n . • 
guilty plea (R. 104 :• 1). i he trial court denied Hernandez's motion to continue the 
hearing to allow him to produce mental health evaluations and documents (R. 104: 51-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Hernandez's motion to withdraw 
-•it vau-M :: * !•- ; • .IUIUI h • h-w urj•; iicmauuc/ jeen 
diagnosed with mental illnesses-including psychosis and borderline bipolar disonl 
the time he entered the guilty plea he was not taking his psychotropic medications. As a 
9 
result, he did not fully understand the proceedings or what he was doing—including 
having the knowledge to ask the court about his counsel's failure to provide him, or 
review with him, copies of the police reports and other evidence against him. Thus, 
Hernandez's plea agreement was involuntary and this court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of Hernandez's motion to withdraw plea agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
HERNANDEZ'S GUILTY PLEA WAS UNKNOWING AND 
INVOLUNTARY BECAUSE HE WAS NOT TAKING 
NECESSARY MEDICATION AT THE TIME THE PLEA WAS ENTERED 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6(2)(a) states that "A plea of guilty... may be 
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made." Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of 
pleas in criminal matters. Rule 11(e)(2) requires that all pleas be entered "voluntarily". 
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and 
Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987). This burden "demands the utmost solicitude 
of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has 
a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.'" Gibbons, 740 
P.2d at 1312 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712-13 
(1969)). The trial court must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v. Thurman, 911 
10 
P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). 
This Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating the clearly erroneous standard for the 
921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996). "However, the ultimate question of whether the trial 
court strictly complied with . . . procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." Id. 
P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 1983). Moreover, a trial court '"personally establish that the 
defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the 
defen'^tn* , i- . I : • : ] ' LUU^ ,nm LUIUL-IMOCU LL^ cieineiiLs 
of the crime.' State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Maguire, 
830 P.2d 216, 21748 (Utah 1991); State v. Hotf, 814 P.2d 1119. 1122 (Utah 1991). 
Finah). in auuiuon 10 confirming that the delendam understands the elements of the 
crime. "•/ "• ' ' • ' <v*enH^ p si^se* • • f T i n d . , - . ] * 
law in relation to the facts1 for the defendant's plea to be 'truly voluntary.' State v. 
Breckenrfdgc, iwv. . _u -r-r- -* i • . » . i .983) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 
Hernandez asserts that his guilty plea was not entered knowing! v or voluntarily because at 
the time he entered the plea he was not taking the psychotropic medications which had 
1 II 
been prescribed to him and therefore, could not fully understand the nature of the 
proceedings or the law in relation to the facts—including the need to inform the trial court 
that trial counsel had neither reviewed with him, nor provided him, copies of the 
discovery and evidence on which the State would rely at a trial on the charge. 
At the close of the August 10, 2004, hearing, the trial court denied the motion to 
withdraw the plea. In regards to the discovery issue, the trial court concluded that this 
was an issue that Hernandez "should have raised at the time and [he] didn't have to plead 
guilty. If [he'd] wanted to see the police reports all [he] would have to have said to me 
was 'Judge, I'm not prepared to plead guilty today. I'd like to see the police reports" and 
we wouldn't have gone any further" (R. 104: 48) 
In regards to the mental health/medication issue and its relationship to the 
knowingness and voluntariness of the guilty plea, the trial court stated that he "reviewed 
the videotape myself to see if it looked like you were confused, if it looked like you were 
having problems tracking or understanding and it did not appear to me that you did" (R. 
104: 49). At the time, Hernandez indicated that he had no questions about the entry of 
plea (R. 104: 49). Additionally, the trial court found that "at one point in the hearing" 
Hernandez made a request (which was granted) for a pretrial services release and that "it 
appeared to me that you understood all the questions that I asked you. Your response to 
those questions were clear. There was nothing in your responses to indicate to me that 
you weren't tracking, that you weren't understanding. It appeared to me that all of your 
12 
stctlenirnfs wnv rlrni anil nHII irln nil ili ill" I T KM 4^ r\(\\ Tlir liinl ml I 11 m 11 in i I IIIIII 1 
that "[tjhere's been no doctor or anyone else testify7 as to the medical effect if you failed to 
take those medications. I've heard nothing like that, only that your own statements that 
At the evidentiary hearing concerning the motion, Hernandez testified th; * K 
entered a plea to a class B misdemeanor assault charge v. igust of 2003 (R. 104: 13). 
Hernandez was not able to review the police reports or other evidence before he entered 
his pl'i:;i htvaiise ii (I i in \ IMIJ lnim III I if1 i»l necessary, and lL.il a class R would he 
okay" (R. 104: 14). Hernandez asked his attorney for copies of the discovery several 
times but was not provided with it (R. 104: 14). Hernandez testified that he has since 
i e\ ie \ \ ed therepoi ts ai:.. .: - WVIUJ .u:-. nave plead SUA[: n ne wow i^ nave seen them 
prior to his entry of plea M * ' ! !.*ni ia<kv testified iVmt \u .f .! . • ' .^m- w : { -; * 
trial court at the time he entered the plea because he was not on his medications and 
because "I didn't know I was supposed u» -.-, . o4, -'•). 
I l e n v j n i l i j y :, * i l"i.*d |l .<: • : d i
 : mscd " N U " ! M t:*:!dS 
"borderline bipolar" when he was in prison in 1999 and in the state hospital in 1997 and 
that he was suffering from the same issues at the time he entered the guilty plea (R. 104: 
1 l ' J 1 : * ' K ' ' \ ^ l ; » " : " ' • . . i • • ,i . . - v .;*. : ; i o s , . . . . ::-fc ; „ . 
said, that's not necessary, he just blew me off1 (R. 104: 17). Hernandez also indicated 
that he told his attorney about previous mental health evaluations from Iron County which 
] 3 
found him mentally ill (R. 104: 18). 
Hernandez also testified that he had been prescribed antipsychotic and 
antipsychosis medications (Seroquel and Amitriptyline) at the time he entered the guilty 
plea (R. 104: 14-15). He was not on his medications when he entered the plea because 
"the jail wouldn't have mental health see me" (R. 104: 15). Hernandez testified that 
"When I'm not on my meds, I really don't know what's going on, I don't understand stuff. 
But when I'm on my meds I think much more clearly" (R. 104: 15-16). He testified that 
he was not able to understand what was happening on the day he entered his plea (R. 104: 
16). Hernandez testified that he was now on his medications and has a better 
understanding of the proceedings and can think more clearly (R. 104: 16). 
Hernandez acknowledged signing the written Statement of Defendant Entering a 
Guilty Plea (R. 104: 19-20). Hernandez also testified that he told the PSI interviewer that 
"I'd been hospitalized in mental health institutions since I was very little, since I was— 
groups since I was about eight years old, and I was currently supposed to be taking 
medication, and that~she asked if I mentioned it to medical or anything, I said I put in a 
request, and then put I was supposed to be seeing a psych doctor" (R. 104: 23). 
Hernandez testified that he thought the trial court asked him if he was on any medications 
that would hinder his judgment at the entry of plea hearing (R. 104: 27). Hernandez 
never told the trial court that he was confused or that he should be on medications (R. 
104: 29). However, Hernandez testified that he did tell his attorney (R. 104: 29). 
14 
In State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, 983 P.2d 556, the Utah Supreme Court 
encountered a similar issue. In Benvenuto, the defendant—who had been charged with 
capital homicide, and other aggravated felonies-entered a guilty plea to aggravated 
murder and attempted aggravated murder. 1999 UT 60 at ^ 3, 6. In exchange for the 
pleas, the State dismissed other charges and agreed not to seek the death penalty. 1999 
UT 60 at U 6. 
Benvenuto subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw the guilty pleas on the 
grounds that his mental condition was such at the time the pleas were entered that his 
judgment was impaired to such a degree that he was incapable of entering a truly 
voluntary plea. Id. at % 12. Specifically, Benvenuto alleged that at the time he entered the 
plea he was confused and depressed; and that he would not have plead guilty had he not 
been in such a state. Id. at <[ 9. He also alleged that his counsel's failure to disclose the 
full extent of his prior mental health history to the court, and the court's failure to sua 
sponte conduct more extensive questioning about his mental state or condition, 
constituted good cause to withdraw the pleas. Id. The trial court denied the motion. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court, citing a number of factors held: "The district court's findings 
clearly supported its conclusion that Benvenuto entered a voluntary and knowing plea. 
There is no basis for us to hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Benvenuto's motion to withdraw his plea." 1999 UT 60 at \ 23. 
Hernandez asserts that there are several important factual distinctions between this 
15 
case and Benvenuto which compel this Court to conclude that the trial court, in this case, 
did abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea: 
One, in Benvenuto, counsel was aware of the defendant's mental condition and 
"had been scrupulously attentive... from the time they were appointed." Benvenuto, 1999 
UT 60 at % 14. Prior to the entry of plea, Benvenuto's counsel had filed a petition for a 
competency evaluation and even requested an updated evaluation from one of the forensic 
examiners concerning his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. Id. at Y(f 5, 19. 
Benvenuto's counsel similarly reminded the trial court of his mental health issues during 
the plea colloquy. Id. at f 7. 
Conversely, in this case, Hernandez testified that he informed his counsel of his 
mental health issues but that counsel said "that's not necessary" and "just blew me off (R. 
104: 17). Hernandez also testified that he told his attorney that he was confused and 
should be on medications (R. 104: 29). While Hernandez testified that he recalled the 
trial court asking him if he was on any medications that would hinder his judgment at the 
time he entered the plea (R. 104: 27), the transcript of the entry of plea hearing contains 
no such admonition (R. 104: 1-5). The written Statement of Defendant Entering a Guilty 
Plea does contain the following language: "I am not under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs or anything that would impair my judgment right now" (R. 84). The written 
statement, however, does not contain language concerning the absence of necessary 
medication. 
16 
Two, legal counsel for Benvenuto closely consulted with him for months and 
"almost daily during the week prior to his entry of plea." 1999 UT 60 at <[ 14. In this 
case, Hernandez entered a plea (albeit to a misdemeanor charge) approximately one 
month after the criminal information was filed. Hernandez testified that he tried 
repeatedly to have discovery materials provided to him by counsel prior to the entry of 
plea (R. 104: 14). However, Hernandez testified that counsel told him "it's not necessary, 
and that a class B would be okay." Id. 
Three, prior to the entry of plea Benvenuto had been found to be competent to 
proceed to trial by two forensic examiners, and had been re-evaluated in regards to his 
competency to knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea~Dr. Gregory "noted that 
Benvenuto was somewhat depressed but that there was nothing in his mental condition 
that would prevent him from entering a knowing and voluntary plea." Benvenuto, 1999 
UT 60 at Iffl 5, 19. Furthermore, Benvenuto was interviewed by a licensed psychologist 
two months after he entered the pleas and the interviewer concluded that though he 
suffered from depression, there were "no other psychological issues relevant to 
[Benvenuto's] competence to enter a plea." Id at 120. In this case, Hernandez testified 
that he was not simply "depressed" at the time he entered the plea but that he had been 
previously diagnosed as with "psychosis" and found to be "borderline bipolar" and that he 
had not been provided with his prescribed psychotropic medications by the jail (R. 104: 
14-17). Hernandez testified further that "when I'm not on my meds, I really don't know 
17 
what's going on, I don't understand stuff (R. 104: 15-16). Hernandez testified that he 
had informed his counsel about his mental health history, however, counsel did not 
investigate or make any inquiry as to his competncy nor did counsel advise the court of 
that history. 
Hernandez asserts that the only factor in this case which weighs in favor of the 
conclusion reached by the Utah Supreme Court in Benvenuto is the trial court's personal 
observations of the entry of plea. 1999 UT 60 at f^ 21. Judge Reese indicated that he had 
reviewed the videotape from the entry of plea hearing and found that Hernandez did not 
appear to be confused or to be having problems tracking or understanding the proceedings 
(R. 104: 49). Specifically, Judge Reese found that "at one point in the hearing" 
Hernandez made a request (which was granted) for a pretrial services release and that "it 
appeared to me that [Hernandez] understood all the questions that I asked [him]. [His] 
response to those questions were clear. There was nothing in [his] responses to indicate 
to me that [he] wasn't tracking, that [he] wasn't understanding. It appeared to me that all 
of [his] statements were clear and well articulated" (R. 104: 49-50). 
Hernandez asserts that the trial court's personal observations alone, are insufficient 
to support a conclusion that his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. He asserts that 
without his medicine, he was in no frame of mind to understand the proceedings, 
especially to understand the nature of the elements he was pleading guilty to (without the 
benefit of discovery), or even the importance of reviewing the discovery and police 
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reports before entering the plea or of raising the lack of discovery with the trial court prior 
to the entry of plea. Accordingly, Hernandez asks that this Court conclude that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
Hernandez asks that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea and that this matter be remanded to the Third District Court with 
instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn. 
SUBMITTED this 6th day of April, 2005. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Counsel for George Hernandez 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing brief was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Christina Ortega, Deputy District Attorney, 111 East Broadway, Suite 
400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 6th day of April, 2005. 
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Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
e or Defendant Case Number 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I have received and read or had read to me a copy of the Information which states the cnme(s) with 
which I am charged I understand the charges against me I have no questions about what I am 
accused of having done 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTION RIGHTS 
Under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States I have the following rights 
1) COUNSEL I have the right to consult with ana be represented by an attorney If the judge 
were to determine tha t I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint 
one to represent me I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for 
the appomted lawyer's service to me 
2) PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION Although I can choose to testify if I wish, 
I cannot be forced by anyone to take the witness s tand and testify or give evidence agains t 
myself That I choose not to testify cannot be held against me m court 
3) CONFRONTATION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSERS I have a right to see and 
hear in open court the witnesses who give evidence against me I have, if I represent myself, or 
an attorney has, in my behalf, the right to ask questions of those witnesses I also have the 
right to have witnesses who will testify in my behalf subpoenaed or, m other words, called 
to court at government expense 
4) JURY TRIAL I can choose to have a jury hear the case against me Anv verdict rendered by 
a jurv, whether it be guilty or not guilty, mus t be by complete agreement of all jurors 
5) PRESUMPTION AND PROOF At trial I am presumed innocent until proven guilty The 
burden of proving me guilty of the cnme(s) charged is upon the prosecutor who must prove 
each and every element of a crime bevond a reasonable doubt 
6) APPEAL If I were to be tried and convicted of the crimeis) with which I am charged, I could 
appeal from any errors of the law tha t may have resu l ted in my conviction By law, an 
appeal must be taken within 30 days of entry of judgment 
I understand each of these constitutional rights They have been explained to me by the judge or 
a lawyer I have no quest ion about them I know t h a t I could plead not guilty and exercise all 
of the rights listed above I understand tha t bv enter ing a plea of guilty I AM GIVING UP THESE 
coNsrnunoNAL RIGHTS 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA 
I am admitting that I did commit the crime(s) to which I plead guilty. I convict myself the same 
as if I were found guilty by judge or jury. Where more than one crime is involved, sentences may 
be imposed one after another, consecutively, or may run at the same time, concurrently. In sen-
tencing me, the judge is not required to follow what any other person recommends. The judge must 
impose sentence with the following limits: 
OFFENSE 
Class A^isdemeanor 
^ 'Class B Misdemeanor 
^Jtass^S-imsdemeanor 
Infraction 
JAIL 
0 - 365 days 
0 - 180 days 
0 - 90 days 
0 - days 
FINE 
$0.00 - $2,500.00 
$0.00 - $1,000.00 
$0.00 - $ 750.00 
$0.00 - $ 500.00 
PLUS MAXIMUM 
85% SURCHARGE 
Certain crimes require added fees or other conditions of sentencing. Most often, a maximum of 
85% surcharge must be added. Some penalties for certain crimes may be greater, or enhanced, if 
there are other convictions for similar crimes. I understand these consequences and have no ques-
tions about them. 
ENTRY OF GUILTY PLEA 
Of my own choice, I enter this plea. No force, promises, or threats have been made to get me to 
do it. I am not under the influence of alcohol or drugs or anything that would impair my judgment 
right now. I have read this document or had it read to me. I understand its contents and adopt each 
statement in it as my own. BY signing this document I am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF 
GUILTY to: /j^j^i 
/ Name of cnmeis) and Class of cnmeis) 
Statement of specific comprising elements of each offense and special terms if applicable (plea 
negotiation, no contest plea, etc.): 
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THIS PLEA WITHIN 30 DAYS OF 
TODAXL£ ¥ ATE £S LONG AS THE REQUESJ I§ $N WRITING AND FOftjGOOQ, CAUSE SHOWN. 
Date 
District Judge 
J. v\ \i£ti:aiAS fa* **"v "*"'• 
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CATHERINE E LILLY (7746) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
fy£fi iter**..-
FN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, 
GEORGE T. HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 031904553 
JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE 
COMES NOW the defendant, GEORGE T. HERNANDEZ, through his counsel, 
CATHERINE E. LILLY, and hereby moves to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds set forth 
herein. On August 12, 2003, Mr. Hernandez entered a guilty plea to simple assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1953 as amended). Mr. Hernandez is 
normally on medications for various mental health disorders. Mr. Hernandez was not on his 
medications at the time he entered Iris plea and was therefore unable to think clearly enough to 
understand its implications or enter into it voluntarily. 
As established in Utah case law courts are required to strictly comply with the criteria of 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Mills. 898 P.2d 819 (Utah 1995); 
State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v Thurman. 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996). If 
Rule 11 was not complied with then the plea is not voluntary. Furthermore, Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the court to find that a guilty plea is voluntarily made 
before the court accepts it. A guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed. McCarthy v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 443-44 (Utah 
1983). 
Mr. Hernandez did not understand his rights, the elements of the charges against him, or 
the available defenses he could make against the charges. Nor did he understand the possible 
consequences of his plea, including the maximum possible punishment and the collateral 
consequences of a conviction of the charges. For these reasons, Mr. Hernandez moves to 
withdraw his guilty plea and submits this motion in support thereof. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-
13-6(1999). 
DATED this [Jday of June, 2004. 
/ 
*M,x iSJ 
CATHERINE E. LECLY 
Attorney for Defendant 
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